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IN ALL FAIRNESS: US AIRWAYS V.
MCCUTCHEN AND THE USE OF
EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN ERISA
REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS
RAVI PATEL
I. INTRODUCTION
A dramatically growing number of Americans are tying up their
personal financial stability with the continued solvency of their
1
employer-maintained benefit plans. To help ensure that plans fulfill
their promises to employees, Congress passed the Employee
2
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Though ERISA
does not require employers to provide any specific benefits, it does
demand that employers who do offer benefit plans adhere to ERISA’s
3
regulations.
4
In US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, the Supreme Court will
consider the scope of a benefit-plan fiduciary’s ability to seek relief
from an employee who has violated a term of his ERISA-governed
5
plan. In particular, Petitioner US Airways asks the Court to define a
fiduciary’s right to demand reimbursement for medical expenses paid
by a plan when a beneficiary later recovers damages from a third
2014 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. I thank Andrew Hand, Katie McEvilly,
David Houska, Jonathan Rash, Min Lee, Patrick Jamieson, and Elisa Sielski, all of whom not
only provided thorough editing, but did so during final exams.
1. See generally LEE T. POLK, 1 ERISA PRACTICE AND LITIGATION § 1:5 (2012) (stating
that pension and welfare benefit assets in ERISA-governed plans exceeded two trillion dollars
in 1980 and, by 2011, private retirement assets were approaching twenty trillion dollars).
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2,
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001).
3. See Capira-Ryan ex rel. Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1996)
(“ERISA neither requires a welfare plan to contain a subrogation clause nor does it bar such
clauses or otherwise regulate their content.”), abrogated on other grounds by US Airways, Inc.
v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 677 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 36 (U.S. June 25, 2012)
(No. 11-1285).
4. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, No. 11-1285 (U.S. argued Nov. 27, 2012).
5. Brief of Petitioner at i, US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, No. 11-1285 (U.S. Aug. 29,
2012).
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6

party tortfeasor. Although on its face this question seems to address a
simple contract dispute, ERISA allows plan fiduciaries to recover
only “appropriate equitable relief . . . to enforce . . . the terms of the
7
plan.” The Court has already decided that such relief must be
“equitable”—that is, it must be a type of relief that would typically
8
have been granted by a court in equity —but it has not addressed the
significance of the term “appropriate.” Answering that question, the
Third Circuit held that a fiduciary’s relief not only has to be equitable,
but it also has to survive application of equitable defenses, namely
9
unjust enrichment.
The Court will decide whether equitable defenses can reduce the
amount of reimbursement that an ERISA fiduciary is entitled to
recover even when the ERISA-governed plan explicitly prohibits the
use of such defenses. While the Court will likely hold that equitable
defenses may apply, it will also likely overturn the Third Circuit’s
decision to apply the equitable defense of unjust enrichment because
in equity, unjust enrichment would not have applied to a
reimbursement clause in a benefit-plan contract.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
In 2007, a young woman lost control of her vehicle, veered over
10
the median, and careened into a car driven by James McCutchen.
McCutchen survived but now suffers from chronic pain and is
11
functionally disabled. McCutchen’s ERISA-governed health-benefit
plan, which is administered by his employer, US Airways, paid his
12
medical expenses of $66,866. In addition to his medical expenses,
McCutchen claims he also suffered damages for past and future lost
wages, loss of earning capacity, pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment
13
of life, and disfigurement—all of which are not covered by his plan.
McCutchen claims that the amount of his covered and uncovered

6. Id.
7. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3)(B)
(West 2012).
8. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002).
9. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 679–80 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133
S. Ct. 36 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (No. 11-1285).
10. Brief for Respondents at 4, US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, No. 11-1285 (U.S. Oct. 18,
2012).
11. McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 673.
12. Id.
13. Brief for Respondents, supra note 10, at 5.
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damages totals between $1 million and $1.75 million.
In an attempt to recover his remaining damages, McCutchen filed
a lawsuit against the young woman and filed a claim for
underinsurance coverage from his own automobile policy because the
young woman was unlikely to be able to fully compensate all the
15
victims of the accident. The combined recovery from McCutchen’s
lawsuit against the young woman and his underinsurance claim was
16
$110,000. After paying a forty-percent contingency fee to his
17
attorneys, McCutchen’s net recovery was less than $66,000.
Anticipating a reimbursement claim from US Airways and assuming
that any such claim would be reduced for legal costs, McCutchen’s
18
attorneys placed $41,500 of his net recovery into a trust. Presumably,
19
the remainder was dispersed to McCutchen.
Following the settlement and pursuant to the health-benefit plan’s
reimbursement requirement, US Airways, acting as the plan fiduciary,
demanded that McCutchen pay back the plan for all of his medical
expenses, even though his net recovery was less than his total medical
20
expenses. The reimbursement requirement stated that when
McCutchen received benefits from his health plan, he would “be
required to reimburse the plan for amounts paid for claims out of any
21
monies recovered from a third party.” Essentially, because
McCutchen collected a total of $110,000 from third parties for the car
accident, the plan demanded that he reimburse it for the $66,686 that
it had already paid for his medical expenses related to the same
22
accident. When McCutchen refused to reimburse the plan, US
23
Airways filed a lawsuit under § 503(a)(3) of ERISA. Section
503(a)(3) entitles US Airways to “appropriate equitable relief . . . to
24
enforce . . . the terms of the plan.” Although the parties do not

14. Id.
15. Id. at 5–6.
16. McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 673. It is unclear whether the $110,000 recovery was intended
to compensate McCutchen’s medical expenses or his other damages. See id. (failing to identify
which damages McCutchen’s third-party recovery was meant to cover); Brief for Respondents,
supra note 10, at 8 (same); Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 9–10 (same).
17. McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 673.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (West 2012).
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dispute that the relief sought is equitable, and that the plan’s terms
explicitly require McCutchen to fully reimburse the plan, McCutchen
and US Airways scrum over whether full reimbursement is
25
sufficiently appropriate.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
ordered McCutchen to reimburse the plan by forfeiting the $41,500
26
held in trust and paying $25,366 himself. The district court based its
decision on the plain language of the plan’s reimbursement
27
requirement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated
the district court’s order, ruling that Congress’s use of “appropriate”
in § 502(a)(3) meant that US Airways’ requested relief needed to
survive the application of equitable defenses—specifically the defense
28
of unjust enrichment. The court of appeals remanded the case to
determine whether such equitable defenses would curtail the plan’s
29
full reimbursement.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Purpose of ERISA
ERISA establishes minimum standards for employee benefit
plans to ensure that employees actually redeem the benefits they have
30
earned. The statute governs a wide range of employer-provided
31
32
benefits. Along with pension plans, ERISA regulates “welfare
plans,” which the statute defines as plans that help cover the costs of a
variety of employee benefits including day care centers, scholarship
funds, pre-paid legal services, and unemployment, vacation, or
33
healthcare benefits. Although ERISA does not require employers to
provide any of these benefits, when employers do establish benefit
34
plans, the plans are governed by the statute’s requirements.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 18–19.
McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 674.
Id.
Id. at 678–80.
Id. at 680.
ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a) et seq. (West 2012).
See id. § 1002 (defining the types of benefits programs covered by ERISA).
Id.
Id. § 1002(1).
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996).
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Though ERISA places dozens of regulations on covered plans,
the statute also leaves room for employers to tailor benefit plans. For
example, employers may require beneficiaries to reimburse their
health-benefit plans when beneficiaries collect tort settlements as a
36
result of injuries for which the plan also paid medical expenses.
However, ERISA limits the relief that fiduciaries can seek to
37
“appropriate equitable relief.”
B. Defining “Appropriate Equitable Relief”
ERISA restricts the type of relief fiduciaries can seek from
38
beneficiaries. Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA allows fiduciaries (like US
Airways in this case) “to obtain . . . appropriate equitable relief . . . to
39
enforce . . . the terms of the plan.” Therefore, although employers are
permitted to include reimbursement clauses, such clauses can only be
enforced through “appropriate equitable relief.” In the context of
enforcing reimbursement clauses, the Court has twice considered the
meaning of “equitable relief” but has not yet considered the
significance of the term “appropriate.”
1. What Makes Relief “Equitable”?
40
In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson the
Court ruled that § 502(a)(3) entitles a fiduciary only “to those
41
categories of relief that were typically available in equity.” The Court
went on to conclude that the imposition of personal liability, which
the fiduciary in Knudson sought to impose, “was not typically
42
available in equity” and actually was “the classic form of legal relief.”

35. For example, pension plans must meet minimum funding requirements, and healthcare
plans, under certain circumstances, are forbidden from excluding beneficiaries on the basis of
preexisting conditions. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1082, 1181(a).
36. See Capria-Ryan ex rel. Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1996)
(“ERISA neither requires a welfare plan to contain a subrogation clause nor does it bar such
clauses or otherwise regulate their content.”), abrogated on other grounds by US Airways, Inc.
v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 677 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 36 (U.S. June 25, 2012)
(No. 11-1285).
37. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
41. Id. at 205 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256
(1993)).
42. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255).
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43

Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc. further excavated
the definition of “equitable relief.” The Court held that
reimbursement did constitute equitable relief where the fiduciary
44
sought “to recover a particular fund.” Unlike the fiduciary in
Knudson, the fiduciary in Sereboff “sought its recovery through
a[n] . . . equitable lien on a specifically identified fund, not from the
45
Sereboffs’ assets generally.” Equitable liens, which identify particular
funds and particular shares of that fund to which the fiduciary is
46
entitled, would have been enforceable by courts in equity and are
47
therefore fair game under ERISA.
2. What Makes Equitable Relief “Appropriate”?
Although Sereboff clarified the meaning of “equitable relief,” the
Court chose not to rule on the meaning of “appropriate equitable
48
relief.” In a final effort to narrow the fiduciary’s recovery, the
beneficiary in Sereboff argued that even if the fiduciary’s requested
relief was “equitable,” it was only “appropriate” to the extent that it
49
survived the application of equitable defenses. For example, courts
have reduced a fiduciary’s recovery through application of the “make
50
whole” and “common fund” defenses. The make whole defense
forbids reimbursement of a fiduciary until the beneficiary has been
fully compensated; essentially the fiduciary must prove that the
beneficiary has been made whole before a court will allow the
fiduciary to claim a right to reimbursement out of the beneficiary’s
51
tort recovery. The common fund defense requires a fiduciary to
contribute to the costs of a tort recovery when it seeks reimbursement

43. 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
44. Id. at 363.
45. Id.
46. See WILLIAM H. BROWN, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 9:13 (2012) (“The
[equitable] lien is usually defined as a right not recognized by law to have a fund or specific
property, or its proceeds, applied to the payment of a debt or an obligation.”).
47. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 364. The parties here do not dispute that the relief sought is an
equitable lien by agreement, so the question of whether US Airways’ requested relief meets the
requirements of an equitable lien is unlikely to receive much attention from the Court. See Brief
of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 18–19 (“Respondents . . . do not dispute that U.S. Airways’ action
fulfills the criteria for perfecting an equitable lien by agreement.”).
48. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 368 n.2.
49. Id. (“The Sereboffs argue that, even if the relief Mid Atlantic sought was ‘equitable’
under § 502(a)(3), it was not ‘appropriate’ under that provision in that it contravened principles
like the make-whole defense.”).
50. Roger M. Baron, Subrogation: A Pandora’s Box Awaiting Closure, 41 S.D. L. REV.
237, 247, 249–50, 255–56 (1996).
51. Id. at 249–50.
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52

from the proceeds of that recovery.
Chief Justice Roberts unceremoniously brushed away the
beneficiary’s attempt to apply equitable defenses because the lower
courts had not considered the beneficiary’s last-ditch argument about
53
appropriateness. Therefore, although Knudson and Sereboff began to
give shape to the meaning of “equitable relief,” they did not reach the
question of what makes a fiduciary’s equitable relief “appropriate.”
Although the Court has held that a party must “do equity in order to
54
get equity,” it has not provided guidance to address whether a judge,
in fashioning appropriate equitable relief, can disregard the explicit
requirements of a benefit plan and limit a fiduciary’s relief based on
equitable defenses.
3. Circuit Split on “Appropriate” Equitable Relief
The circuit courts have split on the question of whether Congress’s
use of the term “appropriate” allows judges to apply equitable
defenses where plan terms explicitly require full reimbursement.
While most circuits that have considered the question refuse to use
defenses like “make whole” and “common fund” to override the
55
express terms of a benefit plan, a minority has held that equitable
56
relief can only be “appropriate” when it survives equitable defenses.
52. Id. at 255.
53. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 368 n.2 (“Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals
considered the argument that Mid Atlantic’s claim was not ‘appropriate’ . . . . We decline to
consider it for the first time here.”).
54. Mfrs. Fin. Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 449 (1935).
55. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. O’Hara, 604 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e cannot
conclude . . . that a balancing of the equities in this case requires application of the make-whole
doctrine to defeat the Plan’s unambiguous reimbursement requirement.”); Admin. Comm. of
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834, 837 (8th Cir.
2007) (“We are not persuaded that the Committee’s full recovery according to the terms of the
plan is not ‘appropriate’ relief within the meaning of ERISA.”); Moore v. CapitalCare, Inc., 461
F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[W]e need not decide whether to adopt the make whole doctrine as
a default rule because the ERISA plan unambiguously establishes a plan priority to any third
party recovery the beneficiary obtains regardless [of] whether the beneficiary has been made
whole by the recovery.”); Bombardier Aerospace Emp. Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot
& Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 362 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ederal common fund doctrines are
inapplicable when, as here, the controlling plan language clearly and unambiguously expresses
that fees and cost are the sole responsibility of the participant.”); Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 692 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[A]pplying federal common law to override the Plan’s reimbursement provision would
contravene, rather than effectuate, the underlying purposes of ERISA because the express
terms of the Plan provide for the appropriate distribution of attorney’s fees.”).
56. See CGI Techs. & Solutions Inc. v. Rose, 683 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[I]n
granting ‘appropriate equitable relief,’ [the district court] may consider traditional equitable
defenses notwithstanding express terms disclaiming their application.”).
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The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Zurich American Insurance Co.
57
v. O’Hara encapsulates the majority view. Mirroring the prototypical
§ 502(a)(3) case, the beneficiary was injured in a car accident,
recovered damages from a third party, and did not reimburse his
58
ERISA-governed health plan for the medical costs it had paid. While
the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the make whole defense is a
default rule of construction in subrogation cases, it held that parties
could contract out of the assumed application of such equitable
59
defenses. There, the plan’s provision that it was entitled to any
proceeds from a third-party recovery “regardless of whether the
covered person has been . . . made whole” defeated any make whole
60
defense limitations. Although enforcing equitable defenses would
have assisted the beneficiary in O’Hara, the court held that it would
detract from the overall purpose of ERISA by forcing the fiduciary to
pass increased costs onto other beneficiaries and by removing an
61
incentive to provide any benefit plans.
In contrast, the minority view, represented by the Ninth Circuit in
62
CGI Technologies & Solutions Inc. v. Rose, is that ERISA gives
courts the power to apply equitable defenses and that parties cannot
63
contract to eliminate that power. The Ninth Circuit held that the
majority rule “read out of the statute the limitation that equitable
64
relief be appropriate.” Citing numerous other cases where the
Supreme Court had articulated the broad equitable powers of the
lower courts, the Ninth Circuit ruled that § 502(a)(3) does not deprive
65
courts of “the traditional broad powers of a court in equity.”
IV. HOLDING
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sided with the
minority view and held that actions for relief under ERISA §
502(a)(3) are subject to limitation by equitable defenses, even if the

57. 604 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2010).
58. Id. at 1234–36.
59. See id. at 1236 (“The Plan’s reimbursement and subrogation provision . . . is clearly
sufficient to disclaim any ‘make-whole’ limitation . . . .”).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1237–38.
62. 683 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012).
63. Id. at 1123.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1124.

PATEL FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/28/2013 3:01 PM

147

IN ALL FAIRNESS
66

plan expressly requires full reimbursement.
The Third Circuit, much like the Ninth Circuit, reasoned that
because “equitable relief” means something less than all relief,
“‘appropriate equitable relief’ must be something less than all
67
equitable relief.” To explain the difference the term “appropriate”
makes, the court stated that “it would be strange for Congress to have
intended that relief under § 502(a)(3) be limited to traditional
equitable categories, but not limited by other equitable doctrines and
68
defenses that were traditionally applicable to those categories.”
69
The court also pointed to CIGNA Corp. v. Amara to support its
finding. In CIGNA, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that a court
70
could use § 502(a)(3) to reform a fraudulent benefit plan. Although
the CIGNA trial court was primarily concerned with fraud, the Third
Circuit summarized CIGNA’s critical reasoning by stating that, in
equity, “contractual language was not as sacrosanct as it is normally
71
considered to be . . . at common law.” While one of ERISA’s
purposes was to honor the integrity of benefit plans as written,
Congress hedged that purpose by requiring that all equitable relief be
72
“appropriate.”
73
The Third Circuit then struck down the district court’s ruling. The
court held that requiring full reimbursement, when McCutchen’s net
recovery fell short of the medical expenses paid by the plan, did not
74
comport with the equitable defense of unjust enrichment. While
McCutchen would be left “with less than full payment for his
75
emergency medical bills,” US Airways would gain a windfall.
76
Because “[e]quity abhors a windfall,” the court remanded the case to
the district court to determine what would constitute “appropriate
77
equitable relief.”

66. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 676 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 36 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (No. 11-1285).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011).
70. Id. at 1879–80.
71. McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 678–79.
72. Id. at 679.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 680.
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V. ARGUMENTS
US Airways and McCutchen each make three arguments. First,
they each make a textual argument explaining the meaning of
“appropriate equitable relief.” Second, assuming that equitable
defenses do apply, the parties argue about which defenses apply in
this case. Finally, they enumerate policy rationales supporting their
desired rule.
A. US Airways’ Argument
US Airways first argues that § 502(a)(3), by its plain terms, does
78
not permit “equity in the air,” but instead confines courts to “enforce
79
the terms of the plan.” Therefore, appropriate relief is any equitable
80
relief that is “suitable under the circumstances to enforce the plan.”
81
Here, the plan explicitly demands full reimbursement. But, US
Airways argues, the Third Circuit’s approach, far from enforcing the
plan, actually re-wrote the plan by inserting a requirement that
82
reimbursement be limited by equitable defenses. Therefore the court
83
exceeded its ERISA authority. US Airways concludes that a plainlanguage approach would enforce the plan’s reimbursement terms as
written because the relief sought is equitable and would enforce the
84
agreement the parties originally made.
Independent of its textual argument, US Airways argues that
because the plan establishes an equitable lien by agreement, the
District Court cannot apply an equitable defense of unjust
85
enrichment. One element that must be shown for the creation of any
equitable lien is an intent by the parties “that [some] property serve
86
as security for the payment of [a] debt or obligation.” This intent
element is generally established either where the parties have an
express agreement or where the application of an equitable lien is
87
necessary to avoid unjust enrichment. US Airways states that the
78. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 17.
79. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)).
80. Id. at 21.
81. Id. at 18.
82. See id. at 19 (“The Third Circuit interpreted Section 502(a)(3) to import into every
ERISA plan an implicit limitation on the plan’s rights . . . . [T]he court does not ‘enforce the
terms of the plan’ . . . it rewrites them.”).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 18.
85. Id. at 29.
86. BROWN, supra note 46, § 9:13.
87. Id.
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plan’s reimbursement provision creates an equitable lien by
agreement because, as in Sereboff, the provision identifies particular
funds (i.e., funds that McCutchen recovers from third-parties) and “a
88
particular share of that fund to which the plan [is] entitled.”
Dredging through more than a century of case law, US Airways
states that courts enforcing equitable liens by agreement have never
“stop[ped] to ask whether [they] should recalibrate the parties’
89
bargain based on some after-the-fact notion of fairness.” Instead, the
only defenses applicable to equitable liens by agreement have been
that the agreement was produced by fraud, was waived or lapsed, or
90
would result in fraudulent transfer. Because McCutchen presented
91
none of these defenses, he has no basis to oppose reimbursement. In
sum, US Airways argues that, even if equitable defenses do apply to
claims for “appropriate equitable relief,” the defense of unjust
enrichment employed by the Third Circuit is not applicable to an
equitable lien by agreement.
To explain the Third Circuit’s reasoning, US Airways hypothesizes
that the court mistook the plan’s equitable lien by agreement for an
92
The latter,
equitable lien to prevent unjust enrichment.
unsurprisingly, is meant to prevent unjust enrichment as opposed to
93
enforcing a contract. Liens to prevent unjust enrichment can be
limited by a defense that they themselves would create unjust
enrichment, but that same defense does not apply to equitable liens
94
by agreement.
As a final catch-all argument, US Airways contends that even if
the defense of unjust enrichment were applied to this case, the plan is
95
still entitled to full reimbursement. Essentially, it cannot be unjust to
96
enforce a contract into which the parties freely entered.
Capping its brief, US Airways makes three policy-based
97
arguments. First, US Airways argues that application of equitable

88. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 30 (quoting Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc.,
547 U.S. 356, 364 (2006)).
89. Id. at 32–33, 34.
90. Id. at 36.
91. Id. at 37.
92. Id. at 38.
93. Id. at 39.
94. Id. at 39–40.
95. Id. at 41.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 42.
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principles discourages employers from offering benefit plans because
they are certain to lose some portion of the one billion dollars
98
collected annually in reimbursement. Second, the Third Circuit’s
approach would increase the burden on litigants and courts by
possibly requiring mini-trials to determine what portion of a
beneficiary’s third-party recovery went to compensate plan-covered
99
expenses and therefore are recoverable by the fiduciary. Finally, US
Airways postulates that the application of equitable defenses would
encourage gamesmanship by allowing beneficiaries to structure
100
settlements so as to avoid reimbursement requirements.
B. McCutchen’s Argument
McCutchen offers only a brief response to US Airways’ textual
argument. McCutchen argues that Congress only meant for the
“terms of the plan” language to limit the types of claims a party could
101
bring, not to limit the power of the court. A claim under § 502(a)(3)
must arise out of ERISA or the plan; it cannot be a freestanding
102
equitable claim. For example, the language would have kept US
Airways from pursuing a freestanding claim for reimbursement if the
103
plan did not contain an express reimbursement clause. Therefore, as
opposed to US Airways’ argument, the requirement that relief
“enforce the terms of the plan” is irrelevant to determining what
104
constitutes “appropriate” relief.
McCutchen also counters US Airways’ differentiation of equitable
liens by agreement and equitable liens for unjust enrichment. To
begin, McCutchen sets aside US Airways’ distinction between the two
105
types of equitable liens. Although the difference affects how the
liens are created, enforcement of either must adhere to the same
106
rules. McCutchen then discounts US Airways’ summation of a
107
century of case law by pointing out that in typical equitable lien
108
cases, there would be no need to resort to equitable defenses. Thus,
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 50.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 10, at 44.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 37–38.
Id.
Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 32.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 10, at 39.
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McCutchen reasons, US Airways’ ability to cite numerous cases where
equitable defenses did not limit recovery tells the Court nothing
109
about whether the defenses actually applied.
Distinguishing the types of cases cited by US Airways from this
case, McCutchen argues that “determining who has been unjustly
enriched” becomes significantly more complicated where a third party
110
is responsible for the initial loss. Therefore, examining cases that do
111
not involve a subrogation right are unhelpful. Instead of focusing on
the litany of (seemingly unhelpful) cases cited by US Airways,
McCutchen points the Court toward the decision in Manufacturers’
112
Finance Co. v. McKey, which held that when a party seeks equitable
113
relief, it must “do equity in order to get equity.” Thus, McCutchen
concludes, US Airways cannot avoid the equitable defense of unjust
114
enrichment regardless of how the equitable lien was created.
Finally, McCutchen counters US Airways’ policy arguments.
McCutchen argues that there is no reason to believe that reduction in
reimbursement will remove employers’ incentive to offer plans
because collection of reimbursement is so unpredictable that it likely
115
does not significantly factor in to any benefit decisions. Also,
application of the Third Circuit’s rule will not “dramatically increase
plans’ administrative costs” because similar rules already apply to
116
Medicaid and Medicare without crippling effects. Finally, far from
encouraging settlement gamesmanship, the majority rule would
encourage beneficiaries to gamble for large jury verdicts instead of
accepting settlements because a modest settlement would be largely
117
reclaimed by the fiduciary in an action for reimbursement.
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
The precise question presented to the Court is whether §
502(a)(3) permits courts to apply equitable defenses to claims for
relief in the face of ERISA-governed reimbursement clauses that

109. See id. at 39–42 (explaining why courts would not need to resort to equitable defenses
in the types of cases cited by US Airways).
110. Id. at 42.
111. Id. at 43.
112. 294 U.S. 442 (1935).
113. Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at 43–44 (quoting McKey, 294 U.S. at 449).
114. Id. at 44.
115. Id. at 50.
116. Id. at 53.
117. Id. at 53–54.
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explicitly require full reimbursement. The Court may also take the
opportunity to address whether the Third Circuit erred in requiring
the trial court to specifically consider the equitable defense of unjust
119
enrichment.
The Third Circuit’s decision gives the Supreme Court an opening
to hand down a decision that will be partially unsatisfactory to both
sides. While the Court will likely conclude that equitable defenses do
apply to claims for “appropriate equitable relief,” it will also likely
hold that the defense of unjust enrichment applied by the Third
Circuit does not apply to claims for equitable lien by agreement.
The Court’s first step will be to hold that “appropriate equitable
relief” allows modern courts to apply the equitable defenses that a
court in equity would have applied. As the Court held in Knudson,
120
“equitable[] relief must mean something less than all relief.” Thus,
appropriate equitable relief must mean something less than all
equitable relief. The most logical limitations are, as the Third Circuit
acknowledged, the equitable defenses that have traditionally limited
121
equitable relief.
122
This conclusion is supported by Holland v. Florida. There the
Court held that, traditionally, “courts of equity have sought to ‘relieve
hardships which, from time to time, arise from a hard and fast
adherence’ to more absolute legal rules, which, if strictly applied,
123
threaten the ‘evils of archaic rigidity.’” By restricting a fiduciary’s
relief to appropriate equitable relief, Congress surely recognized that
it opened such claims to the kinds of specific tailoring that a court in
equity would have applied.

118. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at i.
119. See US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 678 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133
S. Ct. 36 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (No. 11-1285) (disagreeing with those circuits that held that the
equitable relief limitation in the statute has been met “so long as the suit can be properly
characterized as an equitable action, without also asking whether the relief sought in the action
is ‘appropriate’ under traditional equitable principles and doctrines”).
120. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 258 n.8 (1993)).
121. See McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 676 (“Indeed, it would be strange for Congress to have
intended that relief under § 502(a)(3) be limited to traditional equitable categories, but not
limited by other equitable doctrines and defenses that were traditionally available to those
categories.”).
122. 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
123. Id. at 2563 (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248
(1944)).
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US Airways’ response is unlikely to persuade the Court otherwise.
Its central textual argument—that fiduciaries can seek any equitable
124
relief that is suitable to enforce the “terms of the plan” —
mischaracterizes the language of the section. “Appropriate” modifies
“equitable relief,” but US Airways gives no life to this reality. Courts
125
are commonly reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage. US
Airways’ argument violates this cannon because its interpretation
would remain unchanged if the term “appropriate” were stricken; a
fiduciary would still only be limited to any equitable relief that
enforces plan terms. Instead, the Court should hold that proper relief
under § 502(a)(3) must be equitable (as already decided in Knudson),
must enforce the terms of the plan, and must be appropriate in light
of traditional equitable defenses.
But the analysis does not end there. The Third Circuit ventured to
state which equitable defense should limit US Airways’ recovery—
126
namely unjust enrichment. The Supreme Court will likely overturn
this decision and hold that a court in equity would not have applied
unjust enrichment to an equitable lien by agreement.
The Court has already implicitly decided that equitable liens by
agreement are not subject to any and every equitable defense. For
example, Sereboff held that a reimbursement provision essentially
identical to the one here qualified as an equitable lien by
127
agreement. McCutchen does not dispute this conclusion, but argues
that the same equitable defenses apply no matter the type of
128
equitable device at issue. However, McCutchen’s conclusion is also
foreclosed by Sereboff. The Court explicitly held that “the parcel of
equitable defenses the Sereboffs claim[ed] accompany [actions for
equitable subrogation] are beside the point” because the plaintiff in

124. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 21 (“‘Appropriate’ . . . bears a . . . sensible
meaning: It requires that the type of ‘equitable relief’ the plaintiff seeks be suitable under the
circumstances to enforce the plan.”).
125. E.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“We are thus ‘reluctant to treat
statutory terms as surplusage’ in any setting.” (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995))).
126. McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 679.
127. See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 368 (2006) (“Mid Atlantic’s
action to enforce the ‘Acts of Third Parties’ provision . . . is indistinguishable from an action to
enforce an equitable lien established by agreement. . . . Mid Atlantic need not characterize its
claim as a freestanding action for equitable subrogation.”).
128. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 10, at 38 (“[W]hen it comes to enforcing
equitable liens, the rules did not vary with the method of creation.”).
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that case sought to enforce an equitable lien by agreement. Thus the
Court has acknowledged that equitable liens by agreement are
subject to their own distinct equitable defenses.
As US Airways describes, equity actions for enforcement of an
equitable lien by agreement could only be limited by defenses of
fraud in production, waiver or lapse, or prevention of fraudulent
130
transfer. Therefore, because unjust enrichment is not a defense
applicable to equitable liens by agreement, the Court will likely
overturn the Third Circuit’s ruling insofar as it requires application of
unjust enrichment.
VII. CONCLUSION
McCutchen faces an uphill battle in attempting to have the Court
approve an unwieldy standard for crafting relief in ERISA
reimbursement cases. McCutchen might be successful in convincing
the Court that this case should be treated as it would have been in
equity, but that conclusion, while opening the door to equitable
defenses, also limits the types of defenses that can be asserted.
Unfortunately for McCutchen, the defense of unjust enrichment
would not have been used to limit an equitable lien by agreement.
Therefore, while the Court will likely uphold the Third Circuit’s ruling
that some equitable defenses do apply, it will also likely strike down
the specific application of the unjust enrichment defense.

129. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 368.
130. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 36.

